"Repugnant", "Not Repugnant at All": How the Respective Epistemic Attitudes of Georges Lemaitre and Sir Arthur Eddington Influenced How Each Approached the Idea of a Beginning of the Universe by Simon Appolloni
“Repugnant,” “Not Repugnant at All”: How the
Respective Epistemic Attitudes of Georges Lemaître
and Sir Arthur Eddington Influenced How Each





This paper investigates how the different epistemic attitudes held by scientists George
Lemaître and Sir Arthur Eddington decidedly influenced how they approached their
researchoncosmology.Itdemonstratesthedegreetowhichepistemicattitudesmatterin
scientific research. Though both were Christian, a belief in God or in biblically inspired
narratives does not explain satisfactorily why these two Christians remained at such
opposite ends of thinking with regard to the idea of a beginning of a universe, especially
considering Lemaître and Eddington each put forth his case in a scientific manner. This
papersuggeststhathadbothenteredintoadialogueoneachother'sepistemicattitude,a
more constructive dialogue might have ensued perhaps initiating a greater amount of
cooperation.Andwhilethesefindingsmightseemacademic,todayagrowingnumberof
academics, social and environmental ethicists, and activists are embracing the big-bang
theoryas“anewstoryofthecosmos”asameanstogaininganewsenseofpurposeand
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In 1931, physicist Georges Lemaître publicized his hypothesis that the
universe was expanding, not from a steady state, but from the explosion of a
densesingularity,anideawhichwouldeventuallybereferredtoasthe'bigbang'
theory.Whathewasdescribingwastrulyremarkable:itwasapointinthehistory
of the universe when there was no previous time or, as Lemaître put it, “the day
without yesterday” (Farrell, 2005). Lemaître's hypothesis was considered by
fellow scientists at the time as incredible and, in some cases – given Lemaître's
standing as a Catholic priest – disingenuous for the mere suggestion his
hypothesis carried: the creation of the universe. Of all the responses from
scientists, that of Sir Arthur Eddington stands out above the rest as being quite
curious:hefoundtheidea“repugnant.”
Lemaître, who maintained that the idea of a beginning to the universe
was“notrepugnantatall,”triedmanytimestoconvinceEddingtonofthisinthe




Eddington and Lemaître maintained their views as well as the choice of words
usedbyEddington.
If all this still does not seem odd, consider the fact that both men were
scientistsoftopcaliberinthefieldofphysics,thatLemaîtrehadbeenastudentof
Eddington, that both held a deeply Christian faith (Lemaître Catholic, Eddington
Quaker) and that both claimed a restrictionist approach to science and religion,
meaning both refused to extend religious considerations into his scientific work
(and vice versa). What is more, Lemaître actually received some insight for the
ideaofabeginningoftheuniversefromEddington'sowntheoryonentropy.And,
according to a colleague of Lemaître and subsequent writer on his cosmology,
OdonGodart,itwasEddingtonhimselfwhosteeredLemaître'sthinkingtowards




This paper is a response to this question and, by extension, to its





literature concentrating on the arguably more legendary of the two, Lemaître –
has focused on the fact that the men were deeply religious Christians and how
this fact may or may not have influenced their scientific conclusions. Often,
whichever position the author might take, religion is employed more or less to
denote a set of doctrines and beliefs found in the Bible or a metaphysical
conviction of the existence of a supernatural being, God. Although I do not
dispute the significance of this line of approach or deny that there is value to it,
formyqueryitistoosuperficial.
A belief in God or in biblically inspired narratives does not explain
satisfactorily why these two Christians, both scientists, remained at such
opposite ends of thinking with regard to the idea of a beginning of a universe,
especially considering Lemaître and Eddington each put forth his case in a
scientific manner, a point supported by some of the authors writing on the
subject.Ifsuchwerethecase,andeachwasthereforearguingfroma'scientific'
perspective,thenwewouldstillfindlittleinthewayofaviableexplanationwhy
both men pursued their respective positions so passionately. This point has led
metoconjecturethatsomethingdeeperliesbeneaththeirdifferentpositions.
If,therefore,wedigabitdeeperthanthetenetsoftheirreligion,suchas
their faith in a creed or the supernatural, and look at the epistemic attitudes,
those metaphysical values that underpin their reasoning processes as well as
their respective religious beliefs, we find a convincing rationale why, on the one
hand, Lemaître not only arrived at his hypothesis but found it compelling, while
Eddingtonfounditrepugnant.Asstatedearlier,aminorityofauthorstookonthis
approach, but chiefly in regard to Lemaître; if we apply this same approach to
Eddington as well, we gain a surprising appreciation how each man was
decidedly influenced by a particular epistemic attitude that provided a
frameworkforgenerating,sustaining,andapplyingknowledge.Theseepistemic
attitudes were derived metaphysically from the worldviews of their respective
religions.Theseworldviewspredisposedeachscientisttotakeacertainstandon
how much we can know and ought to know of the world: Lemaître by an
epistemic optimism and Eddington by an epistemic reserve. The disparity in
epistemic attitudes, I will show, made the world of difference on how each
approachedtheideaofabeginningoftheuniverse.
That I have chosen to examine two physicists working on questions
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IBSUSJ 2011, 5(1)dealing with cosmology is not accidental. Biologist Ernst Mayr once said, “No
greaterrevolutionhasoccurredinthehistoryofhumanthoughtthantheradical
shift from a fixed stable cosmology to a dynamic evolving ever-changing
cosmogenesis” (Francoeur, 1970, p.x). Science historians Helge Kragh and
Dominique Lambert (2007) aver that the big bang universe cosmology is
generally considered to be one of the most important events in the history of
cosmology ever, comparable with the Copernican revolution. Indeed, this
revolution has had an impact on the collective worldview of society, and today
thebigbanguniversecosmologyservesasthefoundationalperspectiveofmany
academics,socialandenvironmentalethicists,andactivists,astheydevelopnew
understandings of what our role as humans might be in a world marred by
tremendoussocialandenvironmentalupheaval.Inshort,asmypaperwillshow,




on a variety of sources, primary – where accessible – as well as secondary. The
historical research carried out by Helge Kragh and Dominique Lambert is quite
comprehensive and is helpful in understanding Lemaître's epistemic attitude
while some of Eddington's own writings and the historical research on
Eddington's Quaker roots carried out by Geoffrey Cantor and Matthew Stanley
haveprovenmostbeneficial.Ihavegainedmuchinsightbyincorporatingpapers
written by scientists of the same period of time, as they provide unique
perspectivesandinsights.Myaimhasbeentoconnectthedotsonahistorythat
isnotalwaysclear.IshallbeginwithabriefexplanationofLemaître'shypothesis,
as well as by providing the context in which he created it, as knowing the
controversial nature surrounding this scientific revolution contributes to
understanding the passion with which each scientist held his view. By necessity,
then, we begin at the most crucial point in cosmological history: when Einstein
wasdevelopinghistheoryofrelativity.
For centuries the universe was believed to be a static construction. No
one doubted this. Thus, it should not be surprising to learn that in 1914, when
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later to regret having done so – modified his equations to come up with a
differentcalculation.Todothis,Einsteininsertedwhathetermeda'cosmological
constant', whose function was to account for the forces of gravity on time and
spaceand,asFarrellappropriatelyputsit,“tokeeptheuniversehegrewupwith”
(2005,p.31).
Enter George Lemaître (1894-1966), a Belgian Catholic priest, physicist
and astronomer, who, while studying for his doctorate in mathematics at the
University of Louvain in the 1920s, became fascinated with Einstein's work (he
waslatertoobtainhisseconddoctorateinPhysicsattheMassachusettsInstitute
ofTechnologyin1929)(Lambert,1999).Itwasalsoduringthistime,in1923,that
Lemaître became acquainted with the renowned astrophysicist Sir Arthur
Eddington (1882 -1944) having spent a year in Cambridge under his tutelage.
Investigating Einstein's calculations, Lemaître realized that something was not
right about the insertion of the cosmological constant. He reasoned that if the
universewerestaticthen,giventheforceofgravity,allobjectswouldcongregate
atthebottomofthelargestdentinspaceandtime,whichwasnotthecase.Why
were these objects not pulled together into one conglomerate mass? Lemaître
concluded that the universe had to be anything but static, and reasoned it must
be expanding; what is more, all matter would stay separated as the expansion
forcewas slightlyexceedingthe gravitational force.In 1927,Lemaître published
his now famous paper, “Un Univers homogène de masse constante et de rayon
croissantrendantcomptedelavitesseradialedesnébuleusesextragalactiques,”
in an obscure Belgian Journal (Farrell, 2005 ; Kragh and Lambert, 2007; McCrea,
1984).
Thatsameyear,attheSolvayConferenceinBrussels,whichEinsteinalso
attended, Lemaître approached Einstein and communicated his conclusion that
the universe was not static but expanding from a state of equilibrium as
represented in Einstein's own model. Einstein dismissed his conclusion,
purportedly saying, “Your calculations are correct, but your physics is
abominable” (Lambert, 1999, p.104). It was not until 1930 that Lemaître's
hypothesis became known to the broader scientific community (Godart and
Heller,1985). In the next year, Einstein, based on visual proof of an expanding
universe from Edwin Hubble's findings through the telescope, relented and
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disorganization of a system,” and this disorganization, which deals with the
transferofheatenergywithinasystem,increasesfrompasttofuture(Eddington,
1931;Kragh,2004). Lemaîtrereadentropytorefertoincreasingfragmentation,
which means that the universe must be relentlessly and irreversibly dividing
itself into smaller and smaller pieces. By simply going backwards in time,
Lemaître reasoned, the universe would have had to start from a single entity,
which he labeled the Primeval Atom (Deprit, 1984; Lambert, 1999; Peeble,
1984).Lemaîtrealsoreasonedthatiftheuniversedidexpandfromsuchasingle
and dense state, then we ought to be able to find some evidence of it, some
debris from “fireworks” (Godart and Heller, 1985, p. 143; Lambert, 1999).
LemaîtremadehishypothesisknowninalettertoNaturein1931.Itwasnotuntil




because of its metaphysical implications, saying it, “suggests too much the
creation” (Kragh, 2004, p. 83). Fred Hoyle and William Bonnor, both
cosmologists, suspecting the atom theory was inspired by Lemaître's religious
faith, dismissed the hypothesis outright as a mere attempt to find concordance
betweenhisfaithand hisscience(Kragh,2004,p.241-242).Inshort,until1966,
whenLemaître'shypothesiswasfinallyempiricallyconfirmedbythediscoveryof
so-called microwave background radiation (the debris from the fireworks),
Godart and Heller tell us that Lemaître had to bear the brunt of derisive joking
behindhisback,labelinghimthe'bigbang'man(1985,p.142).
Althoughneverderisive,Eddingtonnonethelesswasfirminhisaversion
to the big bang hypothesis, despite Lemaître's insistence. By this time,









his work to confirm Einstein's general theory of relativity (Stanley, 2007).
Eddington claimed, “As a scientist, I simply do not believe the universe began
with a bang” (Eddington, 1958, p. 85). More importantly, in his 1931 address to
the British Mathematical Association, he said, “Philosophically, the notion of a
beginning of the present order of nature is repugnant for me” (Kragh, 2004, p.
105; Eddington, 1931). The choice of wording is significant. Eddington could
have meant to imply that the idea was merely inconsistent. But he also could
have used the word to denote the idea as being so objectionable as to arouse
disgust within him or to deserve condemnation, as both meanings are
encompassedbythisword.
In a supplement to , Eddington (1931) addressed this question.
Here, he seemed to imply that the idea is inconsistent, or certainly
unpredictable. He reasoned that given the incredible improbability of there
beinga“fortuitousconcourseofatoms”weareleftwithtwoconclusions,neither
of which is acceptable to science: one is design, the other is blind chance. The
first (which he preferred to call “anti-chance”) is not the competency of science
toknowandthesecond,mathematically,couldonlycometobethroughinfinite
time, “during which the most improbable coincidence might occur,” and hence,
wasequallyunacceptable.Inotherwords,neitherwayallowsustoknow.
OnemightquestionwhyEddingtonwouldfinddiscussionofabeginning
of the world repugnant while being open to discuss its end, evidence by his
Supplementin mentionedabove.Ifweexaminehisargumentofwhatthe
end of the world (universe) might look like, we notice that it is carried out from
the standpoint of mathematical physics, and even then refers to probabilities
and not certainties. His argument rests heavily on the second law of
thermodynamicswhereentropy,asameasureofdisorganizationoftheuniverse,
stands as a “signpost” for time which is unidirectional (from greater to less
organization).Hereasonsthatultimatelythewholeuniversewillreachastateof
complete disorganization, “a uniform featureless mass in thermodynamic
equilibrium.”Heconcludes,“Thisistheendoftheworld.Timewill onand
on,presumablytoinfinity.Buttherewillbenodefinablesenseinwhichitcanbe
said to on.” Eddington, therefore, recognizes an end of a direction in time by
whichpointconsciousnesswillhavelong-disappearedand,accordingly,stopshis
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organizationintheuniverseandevenfindatimewhenallmatterandenergyhad
maximum possible organization. Once again, though, at this point Eddington
stops short of making claims that cannot be supported by observation,
underlining, “To go back further is impossible.” In other words, while his former
student, Lemaître, was prepared to aver that “the beginning of the world
happened a little before the beginning of space and time” (Lambert, 1999, p.
112), Eddington can make no further claim on this, as we have come to “an
abruptendofspace-time.”Consequently,Eddingtonfindslimitstowhatwecan
knowwithregardnotonlytothebeginningbuttheendoftheuniverseaswell.
Dominique Lambert, a scientist himself, helps clarify why Eddington
believed this. Lambert believes the reason why Eddington finds the notion of a
beginning repugnant is because such a beginning of the world is far removed
fromourordinaryexperience;asaresult,welackthewherewithaltoperceiveit.
Hestates,
Car ce qui est probablement 'répugnant' au [sic] yeux
d'Eddington, c'est de tenter d'appliquer à un
phénomène extrêmement éloigné de notre
expérience usuelle, des catégories relevant de celle-ci
(1999,p.111).
There is indeed logic to this line of reasoning. In his book written in
,Eddington(1939,p.10)underlinesthisargument:
“For, knowledge which has not been or could not be obtained by observation is
not admitted into physical science.” Lambert concludes from this that
Eddingtonwasguardingagainstthemixingoftheepistemologiesofscienceand
religion: the former which describes nature, and the latter which expresses an
interior(metaphysical)revelation(2007,p.54).Inhissameworkabove(1938,p.
3), Eddington avers, “By defining the physical universe and the physical objects
which constitute it as the theme of a specified body of knowledge, and not as
things possessing a property of existence elusive of definition, we free the
foundations of physics from suspicion of metaphysical contamination.” In the
same vein, in , Eddington underlines that any
reconciliation between science and religion, “must be carefully distinguished
fromanyproposaltobasereligiononscientificdiscovery”(1929,p.72). Hegoes
ontosay,“Themysticacceptspremisesthescientistsdoesnot.”Bypremiseshe
means, “The vista of the world outside space and time that it reveals” (1929,
The
PhilosophyofPhysicalScience





There are grounds, therefore, for Lambert to claim, “Or, Eddington est
un Quaker convaincu et à ce titre il ne peut en aucune manière mélanger ce qui
relèvedeladescriptiondelanatureaveccequiestmanifestéparunerévélation
religieuse tour intérieure” (2007, p. 54). However, there appears more to
Eddington'sstancethantheconcern,albeitvalid,overthedifficultyofobserving
and explaining scientifically phenomenon far removed from our physical
experience. After all, although Einstein did not like to speak about a beginning
because of its metaphysical implications, as we noted earlier, he was
nevertheless, according to Farrell, “willing to [my emphasis] the
possibility that the universe had a temporal beginning” (2005, p. 102). Even
philosopher and mathematician (and proclaimed atheist) Bertrand Russell,
writing at the same time of Eddington, found the entropic reasoning behind
there being a beginning to be logically sound, according to Helge Kragh. Russell
states, “I think we ought provisionally to accept the hypothesis that the world
hadabeginningatsomedefinite,thoughunknown,date”(Kragh,2004,p.112).
Moreover,as statedand as weshallseeinmoredetaillater,Lemaîtreadopteda
restrictionist position that was similarto that of Eddington (Kragh, 2004,p. 143;
Kragh and Lambert, 2007, p. 466). In an unpublished manuscript intended for a
Japanese Catholic publication, Lemaître addressed the notion of creation in
regardstohisprimevalatomhypothesis.Henotes,“Thequestionifitwasreallya
beginning or rather a creation, something starting from nothing, is a
philosophical question which cannot be settled by physical or astronomical
considerations”(KraghandLambert,2007,p.467).ItwouldseemthatLemaître
too was keen to guard against the mixing of epistemologies. Yet, despite their
apparent similarities in this regard, Lemaître and Eddington stood at two ends
withregardtothebigbanghypothesis.
Sowhatisit,then,thatforcedEddingtontofindthenotionofabeginning
of the present order of nature repugnant? There is reason to suspect that there
wassomethingunderpinningtoEddington'sstance.Itwassomethinghesaidto
Lemaître in their last conversation together on the ferryboat from Malmo to
Copenhagen in 1938. Lemaître tried once more to overcome Eddington's
hesitationtowardthebigbanghypothesis.Heexpectedhismentortocomment
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Lemaître, “Eddington in a somewhat confidential tone, declared that, to the
contrary, 'he could not trust an experimental result unless it was confirmed by
theory'” (Deprit, 1984, p. 380). It is not clear what Eddington meant by this and
thesource(physicistandcontemporaryofLemaître,A.Depritand,presumably,a
reputable source), does not entertain any thoughts on what he thought this
mightmean.Towhat'theory'mightEddingtonhavebeenreferring?
Toanswerthis,IthinkwehavetolookbeyondEddington'sphilosophyof
science. While not discounting some influence from his particular Christian
belief, we have also to look at the epistemic attitude that undergirds it. As
mentioned, Eddington was a Quaker, and although Quakers are Christians, they
reject any ready-made religious creeds or dogma , emphasizing instead the
presence of the Inner Light within each individual, a divine spark, which might




What is more significant about Eddington's Quakerism is what it said
about the limits to knowledge. In his Swarthmore Lecture, Eddington (1929),
insistedthatQuakersshouldbeseekers,notsystematizers.Whileacceptingthat
hypothesesareusefulinscience,heconsideredthattheyaremerelytemporary








Eddington, creeds and dogmas are anathema, as they are impediments to
seeking truth: “Religious creeds are a great obstacle to any full sympathy
between the outlook of the scientist and the outlook which religion is so often
supposedtorequire”(1929,p.88).Hecontinues,“Iwouldnotgosofarastourge
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(1929, p. 89). With the preceding in mind, we can safely conclude, as does
GeoffreyCantor,thatforEddington,“Empiricismwasthescientificmethodofthe
humble Quaker who looked unflinchingly at God's creation; commitment to a
speculativesystemofhypothesesimplieddogmatism,arrogance,andanundue
restrictiononscientificactivity”(2005,p.238).
Cantor (2005) believes Eddington's gloss on Seekers reflected the
prevalent Quaker attitude to knowledge acquisition at that time. If this is the
case, then, science for Eddington, far from putting an end to mystery, merely
reveals new depths which might fill the scientists with awe but not answers.
Quakers like Eddington, Cantor concludes, “considered that no matter how far
scienceadvanced,God'screationremainsultimatelymysteriousandwonderful”
(2005, p. 241). While Eddington seeks truth as a scientist, like Lemaître (as we
willsee),asaQuaker,thepursuitoftruth(inallaspectsoflifewhetherscientific
orreligious)willalwaysremainjustthat,apursuit,notarealization.
Matthew Stanley's (2007) own research on Eddington's Quaker roots
seems to support this view. Stanley, however, focuses far more on Eddington's
methodologyandhowitwasbasedonametaphysical“valenceofvalues”thathe
carried with him from his Quaker faith. Stanley examines Eddington's rather
innovativescientificapproach,whichtookona“pragmatic,exploratorymethod
that valued opening avenues of scientific investigation over any dogmatic
reliance on mathematics and certain knowledge” (2007, p. 11), and concludes
that–methodologically–Eddingtonthoughtofsciencemuchinthesamewayhe




advances were the beginnings – never culminations – of scientific advances. In
short,truthforEddingtonwasnotsomethingultimate;insteaditwasaprocess.
(2007,p.73).Goodscience,toEddington,wasnotlookingforafinalanswer.
With the above in mind, we can come to a clearer understanding why
Eddington ultimately found the notion of a beginning of the universe as
repugnant and what ultimately he meant by the term. The term is meant to be
employed with both its meanings: as a Quaker, he found the idea that we could
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onanepistemologicalcontinuumbetween'sureness'and'cocksureness.'Thisis
redolent of dogma, which is anathema and, thus, arouses disgust within a
Quaker.Itisthisspiritofcontinuousseeking,the'theory'Eddingtonspokeofon
the ferryboat, which accounts for Eddington's epistemic attitude of reserve, a
stance of constraint toward any judgment that might entertain the belief that
truthhasbeenrealized.
To fully understand Eddington's epistemic attitude, though, it will be
helpful to contrast it with Lemaître's. Undoubtedly, as in the case of Eddington,
other factors account for Lemaître generating his hypothesis (after all Lemaître
was,intheend,correct).Weshouldnotdiscounthisbrillianceandabilitytothink
'outsidethebox'.WemightciteLemaître'scomparativeyouthasplayingarolein
shaping his hypothesis. Lemaître, it is interesting to note, was the first
cosmologist to learn his science within Einstein's world, while Eddington was of
the Newtonian world. But this idea does not entirely add up given Eddington's
prodigiousworkon,andpopularizationofEinstein'stheoryofrelativity(Stanley,
2007,pp.153-193).
Both Kragh and Lambert examine the possibility that Lemaitre's
primeval-atom hypothesis was theologically motivated. It is indeed plausible
that Lemaitre, a Catholic priest and a member of the Pontifical Academy of
Sciences, found resonance between creation accounts in the Bible and his
hypothesis.ButKraghandLambertcorrectlyfindtheclaimunfounded(2007,p.
466). Much earlier in 1926, for instance, Lemaître gave a talk to a Catholic
congress in Malines where he emphasized that “The activity of divine
omnipresence is everywhere essentially hidden. It can never be a question of
reducingthesupremeBeingtotherankofascientifichypotheses”(Kragh,2004,
p. 145). While religious considerations were not completely outside Lemaître's
thinking, Kragh and Lambert conclude, correctly, I think, “they did not motivate
hiscosmologicalideasinanydirectway”(2007,p.466).
Perhaps it might be more helpful to point to Lemaître's penchant for
quantum research as playing a role, as do Godart and Heller (1985). Indeed,
Lemaître's primeval atom was from the very beginning, “tightly bound up with
quantum considerations” (1985, p. 105). Thus, “Lemaître was one of the first













Sir Arthur Eddington states that, philosophically, the
notionofabeginningofthepresentorderofNatureis
repugnant to him. I would rather be inclined to think




quantum theory may be stated as follows: (1) Energy
of constant total amount is distributed in discrete
quanta. (2) The number of discrete quanta is ever
increasing.Ifwegobackinthecourseoftimewemust
find fewer and fewer quanta, until we find all the
energy of the universe packed in a few or even a
unique quantum […] If the world has begun with a
single quantum, the notions of space and time would
altogether fail to have any meaning at the beginning;
they would only begin to have a sensible meaning
when the original quantum had been divided into a
sufficient number of quanta. If this suggestion is
correct, the beginning of the world happened a little
before the beginning of space and time. I think that
such a beginning of the world is far enough from the
present order of Nature to be not repugnant at all
(Lemaître,1931).
The notion of quantum indeterminacy certainly allowed Lemaître to
posittheexistenceoftheinitialquantum,ordensesingularity,withouthavingto
conclude that within it was a programmed, ready-made universe, only the
potentialforone.Inthesameletterabove,Lemaîtreputsitanotherway:“[T]he
wholestory of the world neednot havebeenwritten down in the first quantum
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followedthesameprincipleofquantumindeterminacy.Moreover,aswelearned
earlier, it was he who steered Lemaître's thinking towards the use of quantum
physics. Why then was Lemaître more inclined to see that a beginning of the
world could be very different from the 'present order of nature', using the
principleofindeterminacyrecognizedbyhismentor?
In what amounts to a process of elimination, we arrive at Lemaître's
epistemic attitude, one quite opposite to that of Eddington, in order to account
forhisfindingthenotionofabeginningcompelling.AlfonsoPérezdeLabordaof
the Catholic University of Louvain writes about this. Pérez de Laborda (1996)




and confirmed through proof and verifications. What is , however, is the





fiers de Vérité et sans exprimer aussi notre gratitude
envers Celui qui a dit 'Je suis la Verité,' qui nous a
donné l'intelligence pour Le connaître et pour lire un
reflet de Sa gloire dans notre univers qu'il a si
merveilleusement adapté aux facultés de connaître
dontIlnousadoués(PérezdeLaborda,1996,p.125).
Referring to this passage above, Pérez de Laborda believes, “Il n'y a pas
doute que cela soit ainsi, car notre faculté de connaître – notre intelligence – a
étéparfaitementadaptée(parsonCréateur)pourlirecequiestécritdanscelivre
[here,PérezdeLabordaisreferringtocreation].Lalecturequenousfaisonsainsi
est ce que l'on appelle Science” (1996, p. 126). Lemaître's cosmology, Pérez de
Labordaconcludes,comesoutofabeliefthatostensiblystatesthattherewillbe
a day when there will be no more mysteries. We find this idea reasserted by
LemaîtreataconferenceattheCatholicInstituteinParis.Hesays:
[…] I hope I have illustrated that the universe is not
beyond human possibilities. It is like Eden, the garden








IBSUSJ 2011, 5(1)he could cultivate it and explore it. The universe is not
toolargeforman;itexceedsneitherthepossibilitiesof
man no (sic) the capacity of the human spirit (Godart
andHeller,1985,p.167).
Lambert affirms Pérez de Laborda's conclusion and helps clarify
Lemaître'sepistemicattitudeasbeingoneofahealthyoptimism:
[un] 'sain optimisme' qui permet de motiver l'effort
soutenu qu'implique toute recherche scientifique
véritable.Cet'optimisme'estliéaufaitque'lecroyant
apeut-êtrel'avantagedesavoirque[…]leproblèmede
la nature a été posé être résolu et que sa difficulté est
sans doute proportionnée à la capacité présente ou à
venirdel'humanité(1996,p.85).
Lemaître's belief that 'problems are posed to be solved' is supported by
GodartandHeller(1985,p.178),whopointtoatalkLemaîtregaveattheCongrès
de Malines (at an unidentified date) where Lemaître spoke about the believer
having “an advantage of knowing that the riddle [evolution] possesses a
solution.”
The view that the universe is not beyond human possibilities or
comprehension is why Lemaître, while not dismissing the possibility of the
universebeinginfinite,nonethelessfoundtheideaunconvincing.Bothhismodel
of 1927 and his big-bang universe of 1931 were spatially closed, a choice,
according to Helge Kragh, which was not observationally, but epistemically
based” (2004, p. 139). Simply put, if he affirmed the possibility of an infinite
spacepopulatedwithinfiniteamountofobjects,theuniversecouldnolongerbe
comprehensible to the human mind. Such a concept would run counter to
Lemaître's 'sain optimisme'. Kragh refers to a presentation given in the 1950s
whereLemaîtreevenspokeof“thenightmareofinfinitespace.”
Lemaître's epistemic attitude that held there will be a day when there
will be no more mysteries, contrasts starkly with Eddington's science as a
continuing search for truth for which there were no final answers. That both
scientists were decidedly influenced by a particular epistemic attitude or
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Thisdisparityinepistemicattitudesinfluencedhoweachapproachedtheideaof
a beginning of the universe and caused each to take opposite and passionate
positions on the notion of a beginning to the universe. Undoubtedly, other
factors played a limited role, such as the youthfulness of Lemaître and his
proclivity to quantum physics. And although theological concerns may have
played some role in motivating his scientific understandings – notwithstanding
Lemaître'sprotestationsoffollowingarestrictionistagenda–itisnotthewhole
story. We can take a lesson from this account: epistemic attitudes in scientific
research matter; they affect the way scientists approach the world and their
understandingoftheuniverse.
While this conclusion might seem academic, consider a popular belief
embraced by many scholars today, here expressed aptly by philosopher and
Buddhist scholar David Loy: science is “the most powerful alternative
explanation of the world” (Loy, 2003, p. 67). Physicist Nigel Calder underlines
thatscienceis“themostpowerfulengineeverconceivedfortheadvancementof
knowledge” (1977, p. 14), and evolution biologist Elizabet Sahtouris maintains
that scientists have been given the role of “official priesthood” (2002, p. 72).
Indeed,physicistFritjoffCapraarguesthatscience,andnotanewmysticism,will
prove to be more effective in helping us change our worldviews. He goes on to
say, “In a culture dominated by science, it will be much easier to convince our
social institutions that fundamental changes are necessary if we can give our
arguments a scientific basis” (1982, p. 48). Notwithstanding potential
arguments citing hyperbole, I think we can nonetheless make a case that the
statements aboveadequatelyreflectaprominentworldviewinWesternsociety
today.
If science has acquired tremendous authority in explaining our world,
then, the narrative history of the universe is increasingly becoming the most
powerful mythos for our time, argues Astronomer Emeritus at the Adler
Planetarium and Astronomical Museum in Chicago, Eric Carlson. Indeed a
growing number of academics (from the physical and social sciences and
humanities), social and environmental ethicists, activists, see this “new story of
the cosmos” as providing a new sense of purpose and place to the human
species. Referring to this new Mythos or Cosmic Story, Carlson believes we are





not 'just sitting there'- it is doing something!” (2002, p. 5). That something, he
later concludes – referring to our present environmental and social global
problems–isa“newandvitalperspectivethatgrantsdignityandmeaningtoour
struggle – and gives strength to our determination” (p. 20). Indeed, what
provides Carlson a sense of exhilaration is the concept of human consciousness
asaprocessofevolution.Hestates,
I sometimes like to think of the Cosmic Story as a
cosmic history book – a book of 14,000 pages so far;
eachpagecarryingarecordofonemillionyears.
appears only in the last two lines of this book.
Ourjustfinishedmillenniumfitsinthespaceofasingle
letter…Far from dwarfing our significance, these
perspectivesareupliftingme.Ifeelenthralledthatthe
human consciousness could arise at all, much less in
suchanincrediblyshortcosmictime(p.20).
Carlson's conclusion demonstrates the importance of cosmology today,
asitunderlineswhatmanypundits(scientistsandnon-scientists)arealsosaying:
“FromtheBig-Bang–this?”(p.21).
What are we to make of this rising authority of the scientist and the
provocative mythos that is surrounding cosmology? Cosmologist Brian Swimme
and geologian Thomas Berry have been arguably the most influential people to
popularize this new story (Swimme and Berry, 1992). Their writings and talks
haveinstilledaweincountlessenthusiastsandinstigatingcountlesseducational
undertakingsthroughoutNorthAmerica.Bothauthorsbelievethenewstorycan






Godart and Heller seemed to have intuited much earlier the impact the
big bang theory might have on humans. They write that by its very nature
“cosmology induces questions about the limits of physical sciences touching
upon epistemology, metaphysics…” (1985, p. 160). Notwithstanding the merits
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it are supporting and – at this moment in time at least – maintaining particular
ethical visions of the future (Carroll and Warner, 1998). Because of its import, I
suggest,thescientistswhoconvey'thestory'tousareespeciallybeholdentobe
sensitive to their own epistemic attitudes which may or may not influence their
scientific conclusions. And it is not just scientists; should not those relying on
their work also be cognizant of the challenges and opportunities epistemic
attitudespresenttous?
Much energy was spent over many years by our two scientists in
defendingtheirrespectivepositionsonthethenbig-banghypothesis.Wouldthe
history of science have been different had either scientist had a different







Lemaître and Eddington regarding Lemaître's hypothesis,had both entered into






For myself, I like a universe that includes much that is
unknown and, at the same time, much that is
knowable. A universe in which everything is known
would be static and dull, as boring as the heaven of
some weak-minded theologians. A universe that is
unknowable is no fit place for a thinking being. The
idealuniverseforusisoneverymuchliketheuniverse
we inhabit. And I would guess that this is not really
muchacoincidence.
Sagan,notareligiousman,revealsanepistemicattitudewhichseemsto












According to Farrell, “Lemaître is clearly here grappling with the origin of all things –
including space and time – from an initial quantum state. He would later refer to this
ultimateorigininhis1950collectionofessays, ,as'thenowwithouta
yesterday,' which has been translated as 'the day without yesterday,' a quote often
associatedwithLemaître'slettertoNature”(p.108).
Inotehereasamplingofauthorsofdifferentacademicbackgroundsspecificallytomake
a point: the assignment of religious influence on scientific research is sometimes
presented without deep analysis or only casually suggested. For example, Barry Parker
(1986), , New York:
PlenumPress,147,states,
Eddington preferred to believe that the universe was
originally in an Einstein state, i.e.: static, when suddenly
something disrupted it and it began to expand. This gets
around both the problem of a beginning and a dense
primordial state. But Lemaître, perhaps because he was a
priest,andtheChurchpreferredabeginningtotheuniverse,
wasfascinatedbythepossibilityofadenseorigin.
Most are more thoughtful, but not as rigorous in their analyses. Two I have already
mentioned: Farrell's chapter “Cathedrals in Space,” 2005, p.191-213; Godart and Heller,
1985, p. 141, 169, 171; Don O'Leary (2006),
, New York: Continuum Publishing, 165; Peter E. Hodgen (2005),
, Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited,192, states, “Although
some Christians have indeed used the big bang theory as evidence for creation, others




We must recall that to scientists at the time, the universe was not expanding but static
and,asGodartandHeller(1985,p.49)pointout,“thetransitiontothenewcosmological
paradigmwasnoteasy.”
Farrell brings up the question why he published in such an obscure journal, unable to
provide a convincing answer himself. Given it meant that Lemaitre's hypothesis would
not be known for 3 more years, it was certainly not a shrewd idea. Also, it should be
mentioned – though it is not necessary for my argument here – that Russian
mathematician Alexander Friedman had come to a similar conclusion of the universe
expanding, based on a reinterpretation of Einstein's calculations and he published his
findings in 1922. Friedman had communicated with Einstein about this and Einstein
ThePrimevalAtom
Einstein's Universe: The Search for a Unified Theory of the Universe
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1925andaccordingtomanysources,Lemaîtrewasunawareofhisworkwhenhecameto




journal in 1927, he also sent a copy to his mentor, Eddington. Lemaître received no
response.AccordingtoFarrell(2005)andsupportedbyGodartandHeller(1985),George
McVittie,aformerpupilofEddington,recalledthatEddingtonconfessedlaterthathehad
seen the paper but had completely forgotten about it. Eddington, together with G. C,
McVittie,hadbeguntheirownworkontheproblemofstabilityofEinstein'sstaticworld
model. According to Godart and Heller, Eddington and McVittie believed the problems
they encountered would be overcome with an expanding model. It was in 1930 that
Lemaître heard about Eddington's efforts and immediately sent a note to his mentor
(along with another copy of his paper) informing him that he had already solved this
problem. Any attribution of mal-intent on Eddington's behalf does not match the
evidence: once this oversight was made known to Eddington by Lemaître, Eddington
wentoutofhiswaytoletthescientificcommunityknowofLemaître'sworkandtoensure
Lemaitre received the credit. Furthermore, Eddington was always supportive of his
formerstudent,evenhelpinghimgethisteachingpositionatthel'Universitécatholique
deLouvain.
Here again, we have somewhat of a mystery on how it was that Einstein and Hubble
came together, forcing Einstein subsequently, to change his mind. According to one
source, albeit not a scholarly one, David Filkin (1997),
,London:BBCBooks,86(alsofound–andmoredramaticallyportrayed
– on a video, “Stephen Hawking's Universe” [online, accessed April 14, 2010, available






other authors investigated mentioned this interesting and important encounter. In
particular, the sources, Lambert, Farrell, Godart and Heller, whose works were
particularly detailed as well as the only ones [which I could get a hold of] cited as being
credible sources on Lemaître, according to the website [online] of the Département de
physique de l'Université catholique de Louvain's [accessed April,2, 2010, availablefrom
WorldWideWeb:http://www.uclouvain.be/en-204119.html#livres],failtomentionthis
encounter. Does it matter whether it was Lemaître who prodded Einstein to meet with











Eddington adds that the increase in entropy is the only trace that we can find of a one-
way direction of time;however, he did not make use of the entropic argument to infera
beginningoftheuniverse.
These 'fireworks', of course, subsequently became known to us as cosmic microwave
backgroundradiation;in1965,scientistsconfirmedthepresenceofthisradiationwhich,
in turn, confirmed Lemaitre's intuition. Lemaître was made aware of this discovery by
Godarthimselfaweekbeforehisdeathin1966.Lemaîtrewasdelightedbythenews.




it 'repugnant' until his death. His contempt for such a notion was not entirely new;






no creature less than two inches long and that all sea creatures have gills: “the catch
standsforthebodyofknowledgewhichconstitutesphysicalscience,andthenetforthe




to say Einstein had enough philosophical grounding to realize that “an origin of space-
time was not the same thing as creation of the world out of nothing, a concept he
appreciatedwasintrinsicallyoutsidescientificbounds”(p.102).




scientists have been Quakers in the past. According to Geoffrey Cantor, specialist in the
history of science and religion, this stance explains why some Quakers have expressed
antipathy towards everyday authority, especially the authority wielded by established
churches and exercised through its clergy like the Catholic church: “Quakers repeatedly
sought to undermine these religious authorities, which they portrayed as corrupt (p.
239).
Godart and Heller (1985) are emphatic about this; they cite Lemaître's crossing out a
passageinhisownhandattheendofthetranscriptannouncinghishypothesistoNature,
as evidence of his restrictionist attitude. The passage read: “I think that everyone who













Scientific Journal of International Black Sea University
IBSUSJ 2011, 5(1)God is essentially hidden and may be glad to see how present physics provides a veil





1824 in his now famous about such limits to knowledge. Hancock
assertedthatweshould“followtheplainandsimplepathofobservation,whichmaylead
to profitable results…[but we should] avoid the giddy heights of speculation, where the
mindistoomuchdisposedtolookdownuponthelaboriousinquirer,andindulgeinvain
conceitsofsuperiorintelligence”(Cantor,2005,p.238).
Recall, as Lambert argued earlier, science and religion for Eddington belong to two
different realms. According to Eddington, it is wrong to compare the two ways of
knowing.Theknowledgeoftheunseenworldis“unabletofollowthelinesofdeduction
laiddownbyscienceasappropriatetotheseenworld”(Eddington,1929,p.75).
Stanley, as historian of science, having an MA in astronomy from Harvard University,
places much emphasis on Eddington's methodology. He cites a case where Eddington
beganhisworkonstellarstructurebutdeviatedfromthenorminmathematicalpractices
ofdefendinghisassumptionsandonlythenproceeding:“Instead,heskillfullyandrapidly
moved beyond what he could prove and simply attempted to advance the theory. The
uncertainty of his foundations was justified at the end of his work…” (p. 53). He
concludes,Eddington'smethodologyallowedhim“toprovidegreaterunderstandingand
enablefurtherinvestigation...”;itdidnotservetodemonstrateitsdeductiverelationship
to established facts. Stanley underlines that, at least in regard to his work on stellar
structures,hismethodworked(p.59).
The reader at this point might consider such a claim surprising given Eddington's
which, according to Philosopher Stanley Jaki, was “possibly the
most ambitious ever offered in the history of science”(Jaki, 1967). Indeed, that he
created such a theory would appear to contradict his claims to continuous seeking.
Matthew Stanley recognizes this problematic. He suggests that while Quaker values of
continuous seeking for truth interact with his values in science, evidently, at times this
wasnotthecase.AsStanleyadmits,Eddington's ,unliketheseeking
approach–whichcharacterizedhismethodologyinhisstellarmodels–wasrelentlessly
deductive, requiring “completeness from it in a way he never did from his astrophysical
theories”(p.238).Stanleyexplainsthatinhisownterminology,Eddingtonwasactinglike
an inflexible mathematician, not an exploratory physicist. Stanley stops short of
providinganydefinitiveanswertowhythisapparentchangeinapproachisso,however.
According to Noel B. Slater (1957) who worked on compiling, collating and arranging

















IBSUSJ 2011, 5(1)published posthumously (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948) and it is not
clear whether he ever considered the book to be finished, according to Stanley. While
Stanley avoids drawing any final conclusions on this problematic, his own findings on
Eddington's valence of values do offer a possible clue for Eddington's ambitious
endeavor,though Stanley himselfdoes not makethis connection. Stanley avers that the
spirit of seeking found in Quakerism meant that the scientist too could “take
unprecedented and sometimes unwarranted leaps so long as they moved his science
forward”(2007,p.49).Ifsuchwerethecase,couldnotthispragmaticelementalsofound
within Eddington's valance of values, have made him take the 'unprecedented and
sometimes unwarranted leap' into formulating a fundamental theory, if he believed it
would 'move his science forward'? To argue definitively Eddington's intensions here,
however,willatbestjustamounttoconjecture.ImaintainthatEddington's
doesnotnegatetheoverwhelmingvalueheplacedoncontinuousseekingfound
in so many of his other publications. Unfortunately, definitive answers to this
problematic might remain difficult to obtain, according to Stanley, as the material
Eddington left behind is fragmentary and sometimes confusing. Moreover, there was a
mysterious destruction of his personal papers in 1944 and circumstances surrounding
the destruction are not clear. In short, documents surrounding Eddington's personal life
arenowvirtuallyinaccessible(2007,p.289).




and made Lemaître's restrictionist protestations seem rather insincere to the scientific
community when the pope delivered a speech entitled, to cardinals,
representativesofforeignnationsandmembersofthePontificalAcademyofSciences(to
which Lemaître belonged), expressing his view that the scientific evidence of an
expandinguniversefromasingularityoffered“virtualproof”substantiatingthecreation
story in the Book of Genesis, stating: “Indeed, it would seem that present day science,
with one sweep back across the centuries, has succeeded in bearing witness to the
augustinstantoftheFiatLux,when,alongwithmatter,thereburstforthfromnothinga
seaoflightandradiation,andtheelementssplitandchurnedandformedintomillionsof
galaxies” (Farrell, 2005, p. 196). Lemaître would never have announced this and was
horrifiedatthepope'sindiscretion.
Farrell also underlines this idea, noting, “His primeval atom hypothesis marks the first




of physicist, philosopher and Catholic priest, Stanley Jaki (2002, p. 169), where he
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Thomas Berry is perhaps the most important person to articulate this new story as a
mythos. A simple Google search with the words, “Thomas Berry new story” will show
4,350,000 results in many categories: religious, spiritual, scientific, academic course
listings,eco-initiativesandcountlesspapers.
Clifford N. Matthews, Mary Evelyn Tucker and Philip Hefner eds. (2002),
, Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company. Many authors writing on the subject in
thelasttwodecadeshavefocusedontheevolutionaryaspectsofscienceandhavemade
a connection with religion: for instance, John F. Haught (2008),
, Philadelphia: Westview Press. How each envisions the
relationship of religion and science ought to unfold, however, differs. Such a variety of
perspectives can be found in the important volume Dieter T. Hessel and Rosemary
Radford Ruether eds. (2000),
, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Center for the Study of
WorldReligions.
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